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Penna. Algorithmic Game Theory

ml2.inf.ethz.chsite

The course discusses algorithmic aspects of game theory, such as a general introduction to game theory, auctions, mechanisms, the costs of a central control optimum versus those of an equilibrium under selfish agents, and algorithms and complexity of computing equilibria.

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Theoretical Computer Science
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2026-10-10
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Theoretical Computer Science › Lecture Notes: “The course discusses algorithmic aspects of game theory, such as a general introduction to game theory, auctions, mechanisms, the costs of a central control optimum versus those of an equilibrium under selfish agents, and algorithms and complexity of computing equilibria.”